Circuit-to-Circuit Attacks in SoCs via Trojan-Infected IEEE 1687 Test Infrastructure - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2022

Circuit-to-Circuit Attacks in SoCs via Trojan-Infected IEEE 1687 Test Infrastructure

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Abstract

We demonstrate a Hardware Trojan (HT)-based circuit-to-circuit attack mechanism in the context of Systemson-Chip (SoCs). The HT trigger is hidden inside the attacking circuit and the HT payload travels from the attacking circuit to the victim circuit via the test infrastructure. The common test infrastructure is configured accordingly by the HT so as to propagate the HT payload. We demonstrate the capability of this HT to perform a denial-of-service attack on an industrial Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) connected to a IEEE 1687 test infrastructure.
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Dates and versions

hal-03738329 , version 1 (26-07-2022)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03738329 , version 1

Cite

Michele Portolan, Antonios Pavlidis, Giorgio Di Natale, Eric Faehn, Haralampos-G. Stratigopoulos. Circuit-to-Circuit Attacks in SoCs via Trojan-Infected IEEE 1687 Test Infrastructure. IEEE International Test Conference, Sep 2022, Anaheim, United States. ⟨hal-03738329⟩
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