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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2023

How do coalitions break down? An alternative view*

Carmen Camacho
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  • PersonId : 921371
Benteng Zou
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  • PersonId : 914448

Abstract

We propose an alternative dynamic theory of coalition breakdown. Motivated by recent coalition splitting events through unilateral countries' withdrawals, we assume that: i) the payoff sharing rule within coalitions is not necessarily set according to any optimality and/or stability criterion, and, ii) players initially behave as if the coalition will last forever. If the sharing rule is non-negotiable or if renegotiation is very costly, compliance to these rules may become unbearable for a given member
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Dates and versions

hal-04287200 , version 1 (15-11-2023)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-04287200 , version 1

Cite

Raouf Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho, Weihua Ruan, Benteng Zou. How do coalitions break down? An alternative view*. 2023. ⟨hal-04287200⟩
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