

#### Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks

Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Bruno Robisson


#### ▶ To cite this version:

Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Bruno Robisson. Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Sep 2015, Saint-Malo, France. . emse-01232664

### HAL Id: emse-01232664 https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01232664

Submitted on 23 Nov 2015

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.




Damien Couroussé\* Bruno Robisson\*\* Thierno Barry\* \*Univ. Grenoble Alpes, F-38000 Grenoble, France CEA, LIST, Minatec Campus, F-38054 Grenoble, France \*\*CEA-Tech DPACA, Gardanne, France firstname.lastname@cea.fr

## CONTEXT

The goal is to implement the instruction duplication technique as a countermeasure against Fault Attacks on an ARM 32-bit Microcontroller[1,2]. Operating inside a compiler allowed us to reduce the security overhead thanks to the flexibility and code transformations opportunities offered by compilers

# Workflow



IIC

Instruction

Selection

Register

**Allocation** 

Instruction

Scheduling

Code

**Emission** 

Binary

Code

Back-end

## The user identifies the portions of the program to protect

```
@__to_secure__("fault")
int foo(int a, int b){
  return a * b + a;
```


C source code

The user has a full control over parts of the code to protect

# Instructions cannot be duplicated at the middle-end due to the SSA form

```
entry:
entry:
                                                                                       Unused and will be
                                    Attempted
                                                 mul = mul %a, %b
 mul = mul %a, %b
                                    duplication
                                                 mul2 = mul %a, %b
                                                                                       removed by the Dead
 %add = add %mul, %a
                                                 %add = add %mul, %a
  ret %add
                                                                                       Code Elimination pass
                                                 %add2 = add %mul, %a
          LLVM bytecode
```

## We only select instructions that are suitable for duplication



Generation of 3-address instructions:

Instead of generating add vreg1, vreg2

We generate add vreg3, vreg1, vreg2

# Registers are allocated in favor of duplication

The register allocator tends to reduce register pressure: Reusing the allocated registers as soon as possible  $\{L(vreg3)\} \cap \{L(vreg1) \cdot L(vreg2)\} = \emptyset$ When the liveness intervals (L) of registers are disjoint:



## Instructions are duplicated before scheduling

```
str r5, [r3, #4]
                                       add r0, r1, r2
add r0, r1, r2
                          Duplication
                                                                Scheduling
                                                                              add r0, r1, r2
                                       add r0, r1, r2
str r5, [r3, #4]
                                                                             str r5, [r3, #4]
                                       str r5, [r3, #4]
    Before duplication
                                                                              add r0, r1, r2
                                       str r5, [r3, #4]
                                           Before scheduling
                                                                                  After scheduling
```

## Comparison with assembly approach

|                 | Instruction    | Transformation | Duplication    |     | AES 8-bit NIST on ARM Cortex-M3 |              |          |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----|---------------------------------|--------------|----------|
|                 | add r0, r0, r2 | mov rx, r0     | mov rx, r0     |     | Unprotected                     | Protected    | Overhead |
| <b>Assembly</b> |                | add r0, rx, r2 | mov rx, r0     |     | 8541 cycles                     | 17311 cycles | × 2.03   |
| approach        |                |                | add r0, rx, r2 | X 4 |                                 |              |          |
|                 |                |                | add r0, rx, r2 |     |                                 |              |          |
| Our             | add r0, r1, r2 |                | add r0, r1, r2 |     |                                 |              |          |
| approach        |                |                | add r0, r1, r2 | X 2 |                                 |              |          |

## FUTURE WORK & REFERENCES

## FUTURE WORK

- Using code annotation for more flexibility when defining the code regions to protect
- Automatic identification of the most vulnerable parts of the program
- compiler-based implementation of the masking countermeasure



### REFERENCES

[1] Barenghi et al. Countermeasures against fault attacks on software implemented AES

[2] Moro et al. Electromagnetic Fault Injection: Towards a Fault Model on a 32-bit Microcontroller

### LEGEND



