Secure Docking Station and its protection against hardware attacks
Abstract
Security and Trust in communication systems where very sensitive information are exchanged is achieved and retained through hardware means. In the SECRICOM project where seamless, interoperable crisis management communication is required, we have developed a security and trust managements mechanism based on a smart card like hardware structure called Secure Docking Module (SDM). However, given the highly secure and hostile environment (emergency, crisis situation) where the SDM needs to function, this security module can be the subject of many attacks. While cryptanalytic attacks on the SDM security are impossible due to the employed strong cryptographic algorithms, attacks targeting the SDM implementation constitute a pragmatic threat that cannot be neglected. In this paper, we address possible hardware issues of the SDM chip and focus on the Hardware attack protection mechanisms especially on the SDM RSA and AES cryptographic accelerators. We present the research work that was done through the SECRICOM project on the above issues and analyze the basic concept behind the protected RSA-AES structures that complement the SDM architecture. Those hardware structures are fully compatible with the SDM protocols and offer strong protection against hardware power attacks and fault attacks while retaining high performance characteristics.