Compilation of a Countermeasure Against Instruction-Skip Fault Attacks

Abstract : Physical attacks especially fault attacks represent one the major threats against embedded systems. In the state of the art, software countermeasures against fault attacks are either applied at the source code level where it will very likely be removed at compilation time, or at assembly level where several transformations need to be performed on the assembly code and lead to significant overheads both in terms of code size and execution time. This paper presents the use of compiler techniques to efficiently automate the application of software countermeasures against instruction-skip fault attacks. We propose a modified LLVM compiler that considers our security objectives throughout the compilation process. Experimental results illustrate the effectiveness of this approach on AES implementations running on an ARM-based microcontroller in terms of security overhead compared to existing solutions.
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [10 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Bruno Robisson <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, February 9, 2016 - 9:49:10 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 7, 2019 - 4:45:44 PM
Long-term archiving on : Saturday, November 12, 2016 - 2:11:46 PM


Files produced by the author(s)



Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Bruno Robisson. Compilation of a Countermeasure Against Instruction-Skip Fault Attacks. Third Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems, Jan 2016, Prague, Czech Republic. ⟨10.1145/2858930.2858931⟩. ⟨emse-01271252⟩



Record views


Files downloads