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Conference papers
Filtering-based CPA: a successful side-channel attack against desynchronization countermeasures
Abstract : Secure implementations against side channel attacks usually combine hiding and masking protections in software implementations. In this work, we focus on desynchronization protection which is considered as a hiding countermeasure. The idea of desynchronization is to obtain a non-predictable offset of the attacking point in terms of time dimension. For this purpose, we present exploiting pattern-recognition methods to filter interesting points for obtaining a successful side channel attack. Using this tool as a case study, we completely cancel the desynchronization effect of the CHES 2009/2010 countermeasure [2, 3]. Moreover, 25k traces are needed for a successful key recoveries in case of polymorphism-based countermeasure [4].
https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01490735
Contributor : Florent Breuil Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, November 18, 2021 - 5:03:37 PM
Last modification on : Friday, November 26, 2021 - 12:04:53 PM
Contributor : Florent Breuil Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, November 18, 2021 - 5:03:37 PM
Last modification on : Friday, November 26, 2021 - 12:04:53 PM
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Abdellatif2017.pdf
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