Filtering-based CPA: a successful side-channel attack against desynchronization countermeasures

Abstract : Secure implementations against side channel attacks usually combine hiding and masking protections in software implementations. In this work, we focus on desynchronization protection which is considered as a hiding countermeasure. The idea of desynchronization is to obtain a non-predictable offset of the attacking point in terms of time dimension. For this purpose, we present exploiting pattern-recognition methods to filter interesting points for obtaining a successful side channel attack. Using this tool as a case study, we completely cancel the desynchronization effect of the CHES 2009/2010 countermeasure [2, 3]. Moreover, 25k traces are needed for a successful key recoveries in case of polymorphism-based countermeasure [4].
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Communication dans un congrès
Fourth Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems , Jan 2017, Stockholm, Sweden. pp 29-32 2017, CS2 '17 Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems 〈10.1145/3031836.3031842〉
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https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01490735
Contributeur : Florent Breuil <>
Soumis le : mercredi 15 mars 2017 - 17:40:59
Dernière modification le : mardi 21 mars 2017 - 16:38:06

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Karim Moussa Ali Abdellatif, Damien Couroussé, Olivier Potin, Philippe Jaillon. Filtering-based CPA: a successful side-channel attack against desynchronization countermeasures. Fourth Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems , Jan 2017, Stockholm, Sweden. pp 29-32 2017, CS2 '17 Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems 〈10.1145/3031836.3031842〉. 〈emse-01490735〉

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