Filtering-based CPA: a successful side-channel attack against desynchronization countermeasures

Karim Moussa Ali Abdellatif 1 Damien Couroussé 2, 3 Olivier Potin 1 Philippe Jaillon 4
1 SAS-ENSMSE - Département Systèmes et Architectures Sécurisés
2 DACLE-LIST - Département d'Architectures, Conception et Logiciels Embarqués-LIST
3 UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes
4 FAYOL-ENSMSE - Département Informatique et systèmes intelligents
Abstract : Secure implementations against side channel attacks usually combine hiding and masking protections in software implementations. In this work, we focus on desynchronization protection which is considered as a hiding countermeasure. The idea of desynchronization is to obtain a non-predictable offset of the attacking point in terms of time dimension. For this purpose, we present exploiting pattern-recognition methods to filter interesting points for obtaining a successful side channel attack. Using this tool as a case study, we completely cancel the desynchronization effect of the CHES 2009/2010 countermeasure [2, 3]. Moreover, 25k traces are needed for a successful key recoveries in case of polymorphism-based countermeasure [4].
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Conference papers
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https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01490735
Contributor : Florent Breuil <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 15, 2017 - 5:40:59 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, February 11, 2020 - 1:18:14 AM

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Karim Moussa Ali Abdellatif, Damien Couroussé, Olivier Potin, Philippe Jaillon. Filtering-based CPA: a successful side-channel attack against desynchronization countermeasures. Fourth Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems , Jan 2017, Stockholm, Sweden. pp 29-32 ⟨10.1145/3031836.3031842⟩. ⟨emse-01490735⟩

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