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Conference papers
Filtering-based CPA: a successful side-channel attack against desynchronization countermeasures
Abstract : Secure implementations against side channel attacks usually combine hiding and masking protections in software implementations. In this work, we focus on desynchronization protection which is considered as a hiding countermeasure. The idea of desynchronization is to obtain a non-predictable offset of the attacking point in terms of time dimension. For this purpose, we present exploiting pattern-recognition methods to filter interesting points for obtaining a successful side channel attack. Using this tool as a case study, we completely cancel the desynchronization effect of the CHES 2009/2010 countermeasure [2, 3]. Moreover, 25k traces are needed for a successful key recoveries in case of polymorphism-based countermeasure [4].
https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01490735
Contributor : Florent Breuil <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 15, 2017 - 5:40:59 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 10, 2020 - 7:58:54 AM
Contributor : Florent Breuil <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 15, 2017 - 5:40:59 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 10, 2020 - 7:58:54 AM
