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Conference Papers Year : 2023

Software-Only Control-Flow Integrity Against Fault Injection Attacks

Vincent Dupaquis
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Olivier Potin
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Jean-Max Dutertre


In this paper, we introduce a new Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) scheme for detecting Fault Injection Attacks (FIA). Our scheme is designed to be as generic as possible and to cover any microcontroller on the market, including non- secure ones. It is a full software approach, designed to detect CFI disruptions caused by FIA. The proposal is portable and designed for a high-level language implementation (C in our case). The main characteristic of our scheme is to link a predictable computed Chain of Trust (CoT) with the assets of a program. This approach classically allows the detection of fault injections leading to an illegitimate path of execution. In addition, this solution is designed to detect when a legitimate execution path is wrongly followed due to FIA. Simulations on several benchmarks finally validate the effectiveness of the method, using a multiple instruction skip faults model.
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Dates and versions

emse-04519722 , version 1 (25-03-2024)



François Bonnal, Vincent Dupaquis, Olivier Potin, Jean-Max Dutertre. Software-Only Control-Flow Integrity Against Fault Injection Attacks. 2023 26th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD), Sep 2023, Durres, Albania. pp.269-277, ⟨10.1109/DSD60849.2023.00046⟩. ⟨emse-04519722⟩
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