Electromagnetic waves have been recently pointed out as a medium for fault injection within circuits featuring cryptographic mod- ules. Indeed, it has been experimentally demonstrated by A. Dehbaoui et al. (Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses - practical results on a cryptographic system, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2012) that an electromagnetic pulse, produced with a high voltage pulse generator and a probe similar to that used to perform EM analyses, was susceptible to create faults exploitable from a cryptanalysis viewpoint. An analysis of the induced faults (Dehbaoui et al., Electro-magnetic transient faults injection on a hardware and a software implementations of aes. In FDTC, 2012) revealed that they originated from timing constraint violations. This paper experimentally demonstrates that EM injection, performed with enhanced probes is very local and can produce not only timing faults but also bit-set and bit-reset faults. This result clearly extends the range of the threats associated with EM fault injection.