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Poster communications

Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks

Abstract : Physical attacks especially fault attacks represent one the major threats against embedded systems. In the state of the art, software countermeasures against fault attacks are either applied at the source code level where it will very likely be removed at compilation time, or at assembly level where several transformations need to be performed on the assembly code and lead to considerable overheads both in terms of code size and execution time. This paper presents the use of compiler techniques to efficiently automate the application of software countermeasures against instruction- skip fault attacks. We propose a modi ed LLVM compiler that considers our security objectives throughout the compi- lation process. Experimental results illustrate the eff ective- ness of this approach on AES implementations running on an ARM-based microcontroller in terms of security overhead compared to existing solutions.
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https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01232664
Contributor : Bruno Robisson <>
Submitted on : Monday, November 23, 2015 - 9:31:13 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, June 24, 2020 - 4:18:22 PM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Wednesday, February 24, 2016 - 2:13:49 PM

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Barry2015-CHES-poster.pdf
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  • HAL Id : emse-01232664, version 1

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Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Bruno Robisson. Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Sep 2015, Saint-Malo, France. ⟨emse-01232664⟩

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