Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks

Abstract : Physical attacks especially fault attacks represent one the major threats against embedded systems. In the state of the art, software countermeasures against fault attacks are either applied at the source code level where it will very likely be removed at compilation time, or at assembly level where several transformations need to be performed on the assembly code and lead to considerable overheads both in terms of code size and execution time. This paper presents the use of compiler techniques to efficiently automate the application of software countermeasures against instruction- skip fault attacks. We propose a modi ed LLVM compiler that considers our security objectives throughout the compi- lation process. Experimental results illustrate the eff ective- ness of this approach on AES implementations running on an ARM-based microcontroller in terms of security overhead compared to existing solutions.
Type de document :
Poster
Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Sep 2015, Saint-Malo, France. 〈http://www.chesworkshop.org/ches2015/〉
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https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01232664
Contributeur : Bruno Robisson <>
Soumis le : lundi 23 novembre 2015 - 21:31:13
Dernière modification le : lundi 24 septembre 2018 - 11:34:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mercredi 24 février 2016 - 14:13:49

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Barry2015-CHES-poster.pdf
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  • HAL Id : emse-01232664, version 1

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Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Bruno Robisson. Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Sep 2015, Saint-Malo, France. 〈http://www.chesworkshop.org/ches2015/〉. 〈emse-01232664〉

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