Compiler-based Countermeasure Against Fault Attacks
Abstract
Physical attacks especially fault attacks represent one the
major threats against embedded systems. In the state of
the art, software countermeasures against fault attacks are
either applied at the source code level where it will very
likely be removed at compilation time, or at assembly level
where several transformations need to be performed on the
assembly code and lead to considerable overheads both in
terms of code size and execution time. This paper presents
the use of compiler techniques to efficiently automate the
application of software countermeasures against instruction-
skip fault attacks. We propose a modied LLVM compiler
that considers our security objectives throughout the compi-
lation process. Experimental results illustrate the effective-
ness of this approach on AES implementations running on
an ARM-based microcontroller in terms of security overhead
compared to existing solutions.
Origin | Files produced by the author(s) |
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