ElectroMagnetic Analysis and Fault Injection onto Secure Circuits

Abstract : Implementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we review the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool.
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Communication dans un congrès
VLSI-SoC: Very Large Scale Integration - System-on-Chip, Oct 2014, Mexico, Mexico. 22nd International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration, 2014, 〈10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2014.7004182〉
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https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-01099025
Contributeur : Jean-Max Dutertre <>
Soumis le : vendredi 27 novembre 2015 - 13:43:51
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:27:19
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 29 avril 2017 - 01:42:44

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Paolo Maistri, Regis Leveugle, Lilian Bossuet, Alain Aubert, Viktor Fischer, et al.. ElectroMagnetic Analysis and Fault Injection onto Secure Circuits. VLSI-SoC: Very Large Scale Integration - System-on-Chip, Oct 2014, Mexico, Mexico. 22nd International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration, 2014, 〈10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2014.7004182〉. 〈emse-01099025〉

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